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Pioneering Approaches to Confront
Sex Bias in Housing*
Of all the services, facilities and other amenities a community
provides, few matter more to the individual and his family
than the kind of housing he lives in .... Through the ages,
men have fought to defend their homes; they have strug-
gled, and often dared the wilderness, in order to secure
better homes.'
T HIS FEELING UNDERSCORES THE IMPETUS behind the federal govern-
ment's efforts to provide equal housing opportunities "for all
Americans. ' 2 It is generally accepted that equal housing opportunity
has wide repercussions, affecting both educational and employment
opportunities. 3 Undoubtedly the most important fair housing legis-
lation is Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (hereinafter the
Fair Housing Act), the federal housing statute that prohibits dis-
crimination in most private real estate transactions.4 Now at long
last prohibitions against sex bias in housing are included under the
Fair Housing Act,5 along with other discrimination prohibitions
based upon race, color, religion or national origin. With the inclusion
of sex, the congressional declaration in the Act "to provide, within
*Editor's note: The textual portion of this article has been read into the Congressional
Record and appears reprinted at 121 CONG. REc. S757 (1975).
Statement by President Richard Nixon on Federal Polices Relative to Equal Housing Op-
portunity, June 11, 1971, in P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING 5121, at 5121. With the
recent signing by President Gerald Ford of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-383 (Aug. 22, 1973) ), it appears the new administration will
continue the same policy position.
2 1d. at 5121.
3 See Milliken v. Bradley, _- U.S -..... 94 S. Ct. 3112 (July 25, 1974) (Stewart, J., con-
cutting opinion); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, Nos. 74-1048 & 74-1049 (7th
Cir. Aug. 26, 1974).
4 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970), as amended, Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, tit. VIII, §§ 808 (b) (1)-(4), Pub. L. No. 93-383 (Aug. 22, 1974).
5 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, tit. VIII § § 808 (b) (1) -(4), Pub.
L. No. 93-383 (Aug. 22, 1974).
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constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States"6 can finally have some valid meaning, as women, comprising
over half the country's population, are frequent victims of housing
discrimination. Congress has finally acknowledged the ignored, but
pervasive fact that females are arbitrarily being denied housing op-
portunities. It is an important step - and a long awaited one.
With an ever-growing number of working women, now con-
stituting 40% of the labor force,7 along with a substantial increase
in the number of female-headed families, from 4.2 million in 1955 to
6.6 million in 1973 (with half of the increase in the 1970's),8 this area
of the law will become increasingly active and increasingly important.
This Note will be a national review of the past experiences with
and potential action in the area of sex discrimination in residential
real estate transactions. Emphasis will be on sex discrimination in
the rental of real property, with a brief review of the more commonly
acknowledged problem of credit discrimination in home sale financ-
ing. The present suitability of available state remedies will be dis-
cussed, with an analysis of the charges filed. And, the emergence
of Fair Housing Act racial litigation will be explored, with a view
towards its application in sex discrimination housing cases.
Scope of the Problem
Discrimination in housing is not a new subject. Indeed, since
1962 the federal government has become increasingly involved in
eradicating such discrimination based on race, color, religion or
national origin.9 Sex discrimination in housing is by no means new,
642 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
7 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
219 (94th ed. 173).
a UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-23, No. 50, FEMALE FAMILY HEADS AS PROPORTION OF ALL FAMILIES
BY RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN: 1.955 TO 1973, Table 1 (July, 1974). These figures do
not include the 8.9 million women who head households, but have no family living with
them. Id. Table 19.
In 1962, the President issued an Executive Order (Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652
(.1959-1963) ) stating that discriminatory Housing policies and practices were inconsistent
with. the public policy of the United States and deprived Americans of equal opportunity,
and he thereby directed all federal departments and agencies to take action to prevent
discrimination in the rental, sale or other disposition of residential property in federally
assisted housing and related projects and in residential property loans insured by the
federal government. The order had little effect, except to stress a fair housing policy position
of the Executive Branch of the government. Several years later Congress passed Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), providing for a cutoff of
federal funds in any federally assisted program that discriminated on the basis of race, color
or national origin. Then came the most important fair housing legislation, Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 it seq. (1970). The Fair Housing Act, which
- covers virtually all private real estate. transactions, was an amendment tagged to a civil
rights bill to give the federal government more control over the pressing problem of violent
interference with a person's exercise of his civil rights. The main bill was specifically a
result of the furious racial turmoil of the 1960's, and it is highly unlikely that Congress
thought much beyond the racial situation. Hence the seemingly obvious exclusion of the
category of sex in the original version of the Fair Housing Act evolved. 2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/8
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but recognition of the problem is recent. A survey of the foremost
women's research centers" reveals that no group has undertaken
or formulated immediate plans to approach the problem; such groups
are too immersed in what they believe to be the more obvious areas
of sex discrimination in employment, education and credit." The logical
agency to conduct such research, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights, 2 has just completed a comprehensive study on sex dis-
crimination in home mortgage lending,13 but has so far by-passed the
problem of sex discrimination in the rental of residential property.
1 4
It is encouraging to note, however, that the American Bar Association,
recognizing that "[w] omen and their familes are frequently denied
access to housing of their choice by a number of discriminatory prac-
tices .... ." recently passed a resolution in support of legislation pro-
hibiting sex discrimination in the sale and rental of housing and in
related services.1 s
Discrimination in housing specifically refers to the refusal to
sell or rent to an individual, discrimination in the terms and conditions
of the sale or rental, bias in advertising the property, disparate treat-
ment in home financing or any conduct that otherwise interferes with
equal opportunity on account of one's sex. Such discrimination is over-
whelmingly against the female sex, although there is an occasional
charge of so-called reverse discrimination against a male. 6
10 American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, New York, N.Y.; Center for
Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.; National Organization for Women Legal De-
fense & Education Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.; Women's Equity Action League Educa-
tional & Legal Defense Fund, Washington, D.C. (July, 1974).
11 Such emphasis is pointedly seen in a recently published law school casebook on sex discrim-
ination, K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (1974),
which includes no mention of sex discrimination in housing. As this paper will show, there
is virtually no case law in this area.
12 The United States Commission on Civil Rights was established by Congress in 1957 to
research areas involving a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution
because of color, race, national origin, religion, or sex.
13 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS IT?, A
CASE STUDY IN MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
(1974) (copy available from U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 20425)..
14There are possibilities that the Commission will study the situation in 1975. Interview
with Diane Graham, Office of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, United States Comm'n on
Civil Rights, July 23, 1974.
1 ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, Report to the House of
Delegates, No. 101 (Aug., 1974).
16 Since the state law prohibiting sex discrimination in housing became effective (Dec., 1973
- June, 1974), the Ohio Civil Rights Commission has received one charge claiming the
apartment owner refused to rent to males. The respondent's argument was the males make
"too much noise." During the investigation, the respondent came into compliance by
renting to two males, so the issue is now moot, insofar as the Commission is concerned.
In the past several years, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission has received five cases
dealing with the refusal to rent to males with long hair. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COM-
M'N REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES FILED UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING LAW
(Aug. 14, 1972-May 23, 1974).
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Home Financing Bias
In contrast to the relatively inactive and ignored field of sex
discrimination in home rentals, bias against women in home financing
currently is the area which is receiving the most attention regarding
lack of equal opportunity in housing. Credit discrimination is inex-
tricably tied to discrimination in the sale of real property. There are
two categories of financing bias: first, a real estate broker discrim-
inates in his dealings with a woman because of his assumption that
she will be unable to assume a mortgage; second, a mortgage company
directly refuses to give a woman a mortgage. Perhaps the most cred-
itable reasearch in this area is the study recently completed by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights on mortgage lending dis-
crimination in Hartford, Connecticut.17 The Commission found that
blatant discrimination by real estate brokers and mortgage lenders
is to a great extent responsible for the fact that in 1970, 68% of all
families headed by men owned homes as contrasted to 48% of all
families headed by women. 18
As with the other forms of sex discrimination in housing, sex
bias in home financing is now prohibited by the federal Fair Housing
Act.19 There is also other legislation pending before Congress that
would bar related home financing discrimination. 0 In addition, there
17 MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS IT?, supra note 13.
18MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS IT?, supra note 13 at 1. In addition to families headed
by women, single persons and families in which both the husband and wife work receive
disparate treatment by mortgage lenders.
19 4 2 U.S.C. § 3605 (1970), as amended Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,
tit. VIII, § 808(b) (2), Pub. L. No. 93-383 (Aug. 22, 1974). Also included in the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974 is an amendment to Title V of the National
Housing Act to prohibit sex discrimination in the granting of federally related mortgage
loans. Lenders of mortgage loans for residential real property are now required to consider
the combined income of husband and wife. Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, tit. VIII, § 808(a). Because of the complexity of the mortgage loan business,
it is difficult to prove discrimination in particular cases. In this regard, an important
federal pilot program was instituted in eighteen metropolitan areas in June, 1974, whereby
federally regulated banks and savings and loan associations will assemble data on the sex,
marital status, race and geographic location of residential mortgage loan applications. Such
information is essential for effectively eliminating such discriminatory practices. Memor-
andum from William Taylor, Director, The Center for National Policy Review, The
Catholic University of America, School of Law, Washington, D.C., June 28, 1974. This
program is a result of a petition filed by the Center several years ago on behalf of various
public interest and human rights groups.
20 A federal insurance deposit bill (H.R. 11221, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ) with an
amendment (Brock Amendment No. 1438) prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions
on the basis of sex or marital status was recently signed into law, effective October 28,
1975. Pub. L. No. 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974). (Senator Brock of Tennessee has been a
guiding force in women's rights legislation, being also a co-sponsor of the sex discrimination
amendment to the Fair Housing Act.) Also, presently before Congress is the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (H.R. 14856, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) ), which would prohibit
discrimination in the granting of credit, including home financing credit, on the basis of
sex and marital status, among others. Such legislation is important as it was revealed in
the Hartford study that in spite of the prohibitions against racial discrimination in mort-
gage lending under the Fair Housing Act, discrimination was still rampant. This does not
(Continued on next page)
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is at this time a remedy for home financing discrimination in a num-
ber of state statutes,2 1 but as the Hartford study reveals, women "by
their very status as women, nevertheless are openly considered ques-
tionable risks." 22
A more detailed discussion of credit discrimination is not within
the scope of this Note.2 3 Instead, the less considered, but pervasive
sexual bias in the rental of residential housing will be investigated.2 4
It is significant that in Ohio, which has a fair housing statute, only
14 % of the total charges received by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
concerning sex discrimination in housing involved credit discrimina-
tion.2 5 A similar condition exists in other states having fair housing
statutes.2 6 While the overwhelming number of cases concern rental, this
certainly does not negate the existence of a credit discrimination prob-
lem - the Hartford study alone is enough evidence to show the
extensiveness of the problem. But it does show that women are not
apprised of their rights and their available remedies. More impor-
tantly, it supports the thesis that sex bias in the rental of housing is
comparatively more prevalent than home finance discrimination.
(Continued from preceding page)
in itself negate the potential effect of the Fair Housing Act, but rather shows that Fair
Housing Act litigation, still in its infancy, has concentrated on the areas of sale and rental,
"steering" and "blockbusting" terms and conditions and newspaper advertising. Only
now is attention being paid to the question of racial discrimination in home financing. See
Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., Civil No. C174-153 (S.D. Ohio, filed April 29,
1974).
21 Nineteen states have specific home financing provisions in their fair housing laws. See note
27 infra. Other states have general credit statutes that would cover home financing. See
Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND. L. REV.
409 (1974).
22 MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS IT?, supra note 13, at 69.
2 For further information on female credit discrimination, See Women and Credit: An
Annotated Bibliography, a resource list of newpaper, newsletter and magazine articles,
special credit reports and surveys, government regulations, statements and testimony,
published research and unpublished papers, published under sponsorship of the Ford
Foundation by the Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.
24 Even President Gerald Ford, in his statement heralding the passage of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, only mentioned the new sex prohibitions in home
financing, ostensibly ignoring the other provisions relating to sale and rental discrimination.
Statement by the President, Press Release, The White House, Aug. 22, 1974.
2 OHIO CIL RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON SEX RELATED HOUSING CHARGES (Dec. 18,
1973-June 30, 1974).
26 The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission reports that in the five year period since
the enactment of prohibitions against sex bias in housing only 1.9% of the cases involved
financing. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMM'N, CASE STATUS-SEX DISCRIM-
INATION (July, 1969-June 31, 1974). In New York, just 11% of the sex-related
housing discrimination charges filed during the first seven months of 1974 related to
home financing. NEW YORK Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPLAINANTS ALLEGING SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING (Jan. 1- July 29, 1974). The Colorado Civil Rights
Commission reported 18% of its sex discrimination cases filed under the fair housing law
in the two year period from mid-1972 to mid-1974 related to credit discrimination. COL-
oRADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES FILED UNDER
THE FAIR HOUSING LAW (Aug. 14, 1972-May 23, 1974).
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Rental Bias
In addition to the recent amendment to the Fair Housing Act,
statutes in twenty-five states provide women with legislative protec-
tion against discrimination in the rental of housing.27 It is important
to examine experiences with sex discrimination in housing at the
state level, there being no federal history in this area. Since many
of the state statutes have only been enacted within the last several
years,28 it is difficult to assess the total impact of such legislation, but
enough time has passed to examine the general categories of the com-
plaints. It should be emphasized that the limited experience of the
state administrative agencies which enforce these laws should be
viewed in comparative terms to gauge with proper perspective the
extent of sex-biased housing discrimination. The more pervasive dis-
crimination is found in the rental of housing, as opposed to discrimina-
tion in home financing.
2 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1974) (prohibits discrimination in sale, rental, and terms
and conditions), ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.250 (1974) (prohibits discrimination in home
financing); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-5 (1963) (prohibits discrimination in rental,
sale, terms and conditions, advertising, financing); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35
(1974) (covers sale and rental), CONN. LEGIS. SERV., Pub. Act 74-80 § 53-34 (No. 2,
Feb. 1974) (makes it a misdemeanor to discriminate on -the basis of sex), CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. Pub. Act 73-573 § 2 (App. 1974) (prohibts discrimination in credit trans-
actions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (Supp. 1972) (includes sale, rental, terms and
conditions, advertising, financing); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 515-3 (Supp. 1973) (sale,
rental, terms and conditions, advertising), HAWAII REV. STAT. § 515-5 (Supp. 1973)
(real estate financing); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (1973) (sale, rental, terms and conditions,
advertising, financing); ILL. CONST. ART. 1, § 17 (sale or rental of property); IND. CODE
§ 22-9-1 (1971) (real estate transactions).; 3 IowA LEG. SERV., 263 Senate File 487
§601A.13 (1974) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 4582 (Supp. 1973) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising, financing);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22 (Supp. 1973) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertis-
ing), MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 23 (Supp. 1973) (home financing) ;. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN.. ch. 151B, §§ 4 (3B), (6)-(8) (Supp. 1973) (sale, rental, terms and conditions,
financing), MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (11) (Supp. 1973) (only state that has
a provision prohibiting discrimination against person with child in certain types of housing
accommodations, with certain exemptions for apartments with elderly persons); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1974) (sale, rental terms and conditions, advertising,
financing); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306(3), (4) (Supp. 1974) (sale, rental, terms
and conditions, financing); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118.100 (1973) (sale, rental, terms and
conditions advertising), NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.310 (1973) (prohibits discrimination
in real estate loans); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(V) (Supp. 1973) (rental, sale,
terms and contditions, advertising); N.J. STAT. ANN. § § 10:5-12(g)-(i) (Supp. 1974)
(sale, rental, advertising, terms and conditions, financing); N.M. STAT. ANN. § §
4-33-7(G), (H) (1974) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising, financing);
N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 296(5), 296a(1) (McKinney 1972) (sale, rental, terms and
conditions, advertising, financing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H) (Page 1973)
(sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising, financing); ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.033
(1973) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §
955(1) (Supp. 1974) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising, financing);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § § 20-13-20, 21 (Supp. 1974) (sale, rental, terms and
conditions, advertising financing); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-88, 90 (Supp. 1974) (sale,
rental, terms and conditions, advertising, financing); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.60.222 (Supp. 1973) (sale, rental, terms and conditions, advertising, financing);
DIST. OF COL., RULES AND REGS. tit. 34, ch. 13, § 13.3 (sale, rental, terms and
conditions, financing and advertising) P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING ff 7051.9, at 7055.
2SColorado has prohibited sex discrimination with its fair housing law since 1959. Most of
the other states passed such legislation in the 1970's, a good many in 1973 and 1974.
[Vol. 24: 79
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Pennsylvania, which has had more experience in sex-bias hous-
ing cases than most other states, is a prime example of this. In the
five years that the Human Relations Commission has had sex dis-
crimination statutes in its jurisdiction, over 90% of the 154 sex-bias
housing cases have involved rental - specifically refusals, evictions or
conditions. As the Director of the Housing Division observed:
[T]he overwhelming problem brought to our attention is
rental.... I intentionally made that 'brought to our attention'
because in my experience in lecturing to real estate groups,
community groups and the Graduate Realtor Institute, the
preponderance of questions have related to financing prob-
lems, but to date [August 8, 1974] only 3 instances have re-
sulted in formal complaints .... 21
Likewise, in Ohio, from the time of the addition of the sex category
to its housing statute in December, 1973, through June, 1974, of the
21 total charges received, an overwhelming 86% concerned rental
or the terms and condition thereof.3" In the first seven-month period
of 1974, the Division of Human Rights of the State of New York
received a total of 18 complaints alleging sex discrimination in hous-
ing. Of these, the great majority concerned the rental of housing or
terms and conditions thereof, specifically 82% of the charges. 31 In
Colorado, which has had the sex prohibition in its fair housing law
since 1959, of the 22 housing sex-bias cases filed from mid-1972 to
mid-1974, 73% dealt with rental. 32 The experiences of these major
commissions may well be reflective of the experiences of the other
state agencies.
An examination of several administrative cases, all substantiated
by a finding of probable cause, add meaning to the bare statistics.
For example, at the Washington State Human Rights Commission
a female complainant charged a refusal to rent a house on the basis
of her sex.33 The respondent stated she had doubts about the "coin-
29 Letter from Raymond W. Cartwright, Director, Housing Div., Pennsylvania Human Re-
lations Comm'n, Aug. 8, 1974.
30OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON SEX RELATED HOUSING CHARGES, sup1ra
note 25.
3 1 NEw YORK DIV. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COMPLAINANTS ALLEGING SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN HOUSING, supra note 26.
32COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES FILED
UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING LAW, supra note 26.
33Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, Case No. Y-34-74 (March 18, 1974). Dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status, also prohibited under Washington law, was a
factor in this case. Eight states have marital status discrimination prohibitions in their fair
housing laws (Colo., Del., Md., Mass., Minn., N.J., Ore., Wash.). There is a lack of
authority in the few cases that exist, but the better view seems to be that marital
status is arguably a type of sex discrimination. It is usually the single female in sale,
rental and credit cases or the married woman in credit cases that receives disparate treat-
ment. Thus the specific provision for marital status may not be necessary.
1975]
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plainant's ability to handle a large old house, her being the sole family
supporter, in addition to her role as mother. '34 The Commission found
that the complainant's sex (not a man who could supposedly do
home repairs) was a factor in the refusal to rent, and by a conciliation
agreement the complainant was awarded $400 damages.
In New Jersey, the Division on Civil Rights found probable
cause in the respondent's refusal to rent an apartment to two single
females. The respondent argued that the discrimination was not on
account of sex and marital status, but rather on the combination of
the complainant with her friend, and that as such there was no viola-
tion of the law. The commission, and subsequently the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency,35 held
that the statute intended
to insure the rights of two persons of the same sex who
constituted themselves into a housekeeping unit and further-
more, that such an arrangement is entirely unexceptional.
It is a common practice for young unmarried working girls
to make that kind of living arrangement.36
The complainant was awarded $180 for economic loss and $750 for
pain and suffering.
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is presently exploring the
possible sex discrimination in refusing to rent to a single parent with
a child, a very common situation. The Commission's hypothesis is
that "though the policy of not renting to single parents is applicable
to males and females alike, the policy does have a disparate effect upon
females" because a greater number of women in divorce actions
receive custody and because of an increase in the number of unwed
mothers retaining child custody, all leading to an increase in the
number of female-headed families.37 This study, and subsequent rul-
ings, will have important repercussions in the sex-bias housing field.
A further interesting area of housing bias concerns discrimina-
tory housing regulations, advantages or privileges at universities
34Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, Case No. Y-34-74, Findings of Investigator
(March 26, 1974).
3562 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
36Id. at 405, 301 A.2d at 757.
3 7 OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, SINGLE PARENTS WITH CHILDREN NOT ALLOWED TO
RENT - SEX DISCRIMINATION? (Aug., 1974). Investigative research by Field Represen-
tative Daniel Skoch.
3 A different aspect of sex bias in housing concerns discrimination against homosexuals.
Upon receiving several such complaints, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission has begun
a survey on the extent of such discrimination. Letter from Eleanor G. Crow, Colorado Civil
Rights Comm'n Aug. 6, 1974. A statute was recently passed by the District of Columbia
Council which specifically covers the situation by prohibiting discrimination because of
"sexual orientation." DIST. OF COL., RULES AND REGS. tit. 34 ch. 13, § 13.1 (sale, rental,
terms and conditions, financing and advertising) P.H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING fr 7051.9,
at 7055 (1974).
[Vol. 24 :79
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and colleges. In 1972, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
requested and received voluntary compliance from the institutions of
higher education in the state for uniform housing regulations. 39 This
action abolished a major source of housing complaints. 4
It is apparent from the statistics given that the sex discrimina-
tion prohibitions of the state fair housing statutes have not been
greatly used. A common theory advanced by the commissions is that
the main problem is educational - the public simply does not know
that such discrimination is illegal. This is glaringly seen in a report
from Hawaii that since 1971, when their fair housing law was amended
to include sex, there has not been one complaint.41 Similarly in Oregon,
since October, 1973, when their law was enacted, no cases relating
to sex discrimination in housing have been filed. The Oregon com-
mission concedes the lack of knowledge of the law and is attempting
to disseminate the information to the public.42
The Housing Director of the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission, noting that "my information suggests a serious problem,
but our docket book does not reflect it," 43 offers several explanations
for the relatively small number of cases, in addition to the educational
problem: staff resistance, especially male staff; reluctance to file in
that "a whole psychological spectrum of conditioning has prepared
many Americans to accept their rejection without a word"; and that
the discrimination is going underground."
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission, aware of the public educa-
tional void, instituted a broadcast public service announcement pro-
gram soon after the sex-bias law was enacted. The effect of such
announcements is doubtful, however, as public service announcements
are notorious for being aired during periods of minimal viewing or
listening.
The state commissions seem to be cognizant of the crucial edu-
cational problem, but the state legislatures are perhaps not always
so understanding. For example, in Ohio under the present law,45 the
Civil Rights Commission is mandated to prepare an educational pro-
39 Letter from Raymond W. Cartwright, Director, Housing Div., Pennsylvania Human Re-
lations Comm'n, Attachment VI, Aug. 7, 1974.
40 Letter from Raymond W. Cartwright, Director, Housing Div., Pennsylvania Human Re-
lations Comm'n, Aug. 7, 1974.
41 Letter from Edwin H. Honda, Director, Hawaii Dep't of Regulatory Agencies, June
24, 1974.
42 Letter from Patricia Haggin, Technical Assistance Coordinator, Oregon Civil Rights Div.,
Bureau of Labor, June 13, 1974. In Indiana, only three cases were filed in an eight month
period from September, 1973 to May, 1974. INIDLANA CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, HOUSING
COMPLAINTS (Sept. 23, 1973-April 24, 1974).
43 Letter from Raymond W. Cartwright, supra note 29.
MId.
4 5
oIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(A) (9) (Page 1973).
1975]
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gram for the public schools and all residents of the state. However,
when the legislature added sex discrimination to the Commission's
jurisdiction, it failed to add the sex category to the educational pro-
gram provision. Legislation to amend this has been introduced in the
House, but passage is uncertain."
Looking at the comparative experiences and statistics of various
state commissions, one conclusion that can be drawn is that the pre-
ponderance of attention given to sex discrimination in home finance
by women's rights and other organizations may be somewhat mis-
guided. While not minimizing the totality of discrimination in home
finance, the administrative complaints show more attention and relief
must be directed to the area of sex discrimination in the rental of
residential housing.
State Responses to Sex-Biased Discrimination in Housing
Provisions of the Law
Twenty-five states have fair housing legislation.4 7 In all but a
few of these states, the applicable statute establishes an administra-
tive agency to effectuate the purposes of the statute. The various state
statutes all read somewhat similarly, with variation in the extent of
coverage, the exemptions and the degree of authority given to the
commissions.
Somewhat typical is the Ohio statute. Under the Ohio civil rights
legislation, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to "refuse to
sell, transfer, assign, rent, lease, sublease, finance, or otherwise deny
or withhold housing accommodation from any person because of the
... sex... of any prospective owner, occupant, or user of such hous-
ing" ;48 to indicate there is no housing when it is available; to fail to
lend money for financing for home purchase or repair on account of
sex, if the individual or corporation is in the business of lending
money; to discriminate in the terms or conditions of the sale or rental
or in providing services or privileges; to discriminate in the terms
and conditions of a home financing loan; to print or circulate a dis-
criminatory statement indicating a preference or limitation as relates
to housing; to make an inquiry or keep a record concerning the sex
of the applicant; to include in the rental or transfer of housing any
restrictive covenant; or to attempt to induce a housing sale by making
representations as to the future composition of a neighborhood. 4' Ohio
specifically exempts religious and private or fraternal organizations."s
46 H.B. 1195, 110th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 4112.04(A) (9) (1973-74).
47 Supra note 27.
48OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (H) (1) (Page 1973).
49 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 4112.02(H) (1)-(9) (Page 1973).
50OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(K) (Page 1973).
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Other states have had more initial foresight and have gone much
further in their exemptions pertaining to sex. For example, Con-
necticut legislators have hedged obvious problems with sex discrim-
ination in housing statutes by exempting organizations that rent
sleeping accommodations for the exclusive use of one sex.5 As the
statute now reads in Ohio, a dormitory in a state university housing
only females would be in violation of the law. A similar provision,
exempting dwellings designed exclusively for one sex, is now before
the Ohio Legislature. 2
Iowa has an exemption with a similar effect, though less broad
in coverage, excluding housing accommodations where residents of
both sexes must use a common bathroom.5 3 In addition, many of the
states exempt housing accommodations of no more than two families,
if the owner or his family resides in one accommodation. s4
In Ohio, as with other state commissions, there are two avenues
of enforcement. First, there is administrative enforcement through
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Second, and only for the housing
provision, there is a private cause of action whereby a person may
file a civil action in a court of common pleas.55 By allowing the private
suit, the legislature recognizes the necessity of quick action in hous-
ing cases. Due to the transient nature of housing, for effective relief
for the aggrieved, immediate enforcement is an absolute necessity.
The Administrative Process
Specifically, in Ohio, a complainant may file a charge with the
Commission alleging a discriminatory action. The Commission is
empowered to investigate the charge, and if probable cause is found,
attempt to abolish such practices by "informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion." s If this fails, the Commission may hold
a public hearing, after which, and only then, the Commission may
issue a cease and desist order. 7 The Commission lacks any power to
obtain or impose emergency injunctive relief. As it often takes months
to investigate a complaint, the housing is frequently unavailable by
the time of the order or the complainant has found other housing.
S1 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-35(a) (2) (Supp. 1974).
S2H.B. 1194, 110th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 4112.02 (H) (4) (1973-74). Passed by
the House, June, 1974.
53 3 IowA LEG. SERV., 263 Senate File 487 § 601A.14 (1974).
54See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-35 (a) (1) (Supp. 1974).
55 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.051 (A) (Page 1973). There is pending legislation to
expand this to all areas under the commission's jurisdiction. H.B. 1196, 110th Gen.
Assem., Reg Sess. § 4112.051(A) (1973-74).
56 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (B) (Page 1973).
57 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § § 4112.05 (B), (G) (Page 1973).
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Thus the only power of the Commission in housing cases is to stop
further discriminatory actions and, if it is still available and desired,
obtain the housing for the complainant.
A good many of the states have unsatisfactory injunctive pro-
visions like Ohio. To be effective in the housing area the commissions
need the authority to seek a temporary restraining order. The Alaska
statute has such a provision:
At any time after a complaint is filed ... the commission may
file a petition in the superior court . . . seeking appropriate
temporary relief against the respondent . . . including an
order ... restraining him from doing or procuring any act
tending to render ineffectual any order the commission may
enter with respect to the complaint.58
New York has a similar provision.5 9 This authority is an absolute
necessity for effective dispositions of housing complaints. Until Ohio
receives such authority, its fair housing law will remain only a token
effort to achieve fair housing in the state. Every session three or four
bills are submitted to the Ohio legislature to add powers to the Com-
mission, but few are enacted. At the present time, there is a bill in
the Ohio House that would give the Ohio Civil Rights Commission
power to seek temporary and preliminary relief as in the Alaska
statute.
60
In addition, state administrative agencies must have the power
to award damages to be truly effective in providing appropriate com-
pensation for the aggrieved. The majority of the commissions have
no express statutory provision for damage awards in housing cases.
But it is axiomatic that fair housing statutes are to be construed
liberally. 1 In this regard, some enlighted state courts have correctly
interpreted their civil rights statutes by sustaining the power of the
state commission to award compensatory damages. Obviously the
deterrent effect of paying damages would also further the purposes
of a fair housing statute.
Unusually sensitive, the Supreme Court of New Jersey broadly
applied the Division of Civil Rights' remedial powers and upheld the
Division's award of compensatory economic62 and pain and suffering
damages.1 Though there was no specific statutory language authoriz-
S8ALAsKA STAT. § 18.08.105 (1974).
s9 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 297(6) (McKinney 1972).
60H.B. 1195, 110th Gen. Assem., Reg..Sess. § 4112.05(L) (1973-74).
61 See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
62 Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969).
6 Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
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ing such power, the court held that "it was fairly to be implied in the
light of the 'broad language of the section' and the 'overall design of
the act.' "6 The court disagreed with the appellate division's feeling
that such authority to grant minor pain and suffering awards would
lead to much more substantial claims. In Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real
Estate Agency,65 one of the two reported cases dealing with sex dis-
crimination in housing, the complainant was awarded $180 for eco-
nomic loss and $750 for pain and suffering.
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found nothing im-
proper in the Commission Against Discrimination awarding the com-
plainant $250 for mental suffering for being refused an apartment on
account of race.66 The court implied such authority from a section of
the statute empowering the commission to award damages that "shall
include, but shall not be limited to, the expense incurred by the
petitioner .... '"6 The court found such humiliation and frustration
supported by substantial evidence and noted the general recognition
of mental suffering damages.
The Washington State Human Rights Commission has granted
monetary awards in several sex-bias housing cases, the largest amount
being $400 for "any and all claims for conpensation or damages."'68
The Commission has awarded damages both for loss of rights and for
humiliation and suffering.69
In New York, the court of appeals reaffirmed its holding that
the civil rights statute did empower the division of human rights to
award compensatory damages for mental suffering.70 The court, in
stressing the high priority of the state's policy in eliminating discrim-
ination, stated:
What we do hold is that due to the strong anti-discrimination
policy spelled out by the legislature of this state, an aggrieved
individual need not produce the quantum and quality of ev-
idence to prove compensatory damages he would have had to
produce under an analogous provision . . . particularly so
where ... the discriminatory act is intentionally committed.
71
"Id. at 411, 301 A.2d at 761.
65 Id.
"Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256 N.E.2d
311 (1970).
67MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. 1973).
"Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, Case No. Y-34-74, Conciliation Agreement
(March 27, 1974).
69For the establishment of such damages, see Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wash. 2d 88, 500 P.2d
97 (1972).
7
oBatavia Lodge #196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of Human Rights,
35 N.Y. 2d 143, 316 NE.2d 318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974).
71 Id. at 146-7, 316 N.E.2d at 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
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In direct contrast, the courts of Pennsylvania and Ohio failed to
so interpret their civil rights statutes. In Pennsylvania, where the
matter is presently before the state supreme court, the Human Rela-
tions Commission still continues to award damages, though the Com-
monwealth Court ruled the Commission does not have such power.72 In
Zamantakis v. Human Relations Commission,73 where the complainants
were denied an apartment because of race and sex, the court, pointing
out the absence of statutory language authorizing compensatory dam-
ages and the absence of legislative intent, stressed that a regulatory
agency as the Commission cannot exceed the powers given by the legis-
lature. The court rejected the Commission's argument that statutory
language authorizing the Commission to take "affirmative action" 74 in-
cluded the awarding of damages, but rather interpreted the section to
mean the Commission could only order the repondent to take affirmative
action. In a companion case, Straw v. Human Relations Commission,"
the court acknowledged the similarity of the Pennsylvania statute
to the New Jersey statute where such authority was approved, but
felt the Pennsylvania case seeking $3,500 damages for suffering
disproved the New Jersey Supreme Court which doubted such awards
could ever become substantial. In addition, the court stressed the
informality of administrative proceedings conducted by persons not
necessarily knowledgeable of the law, and as such ruled damage awards
must be left to the courts.
Likewise in Ohio, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysy, 76 the
state supreme court stripped the Ohio Civil Rights Commission of
any power to award compensatory or punitive damages. In doing so,
it appears the court disregarded the mandate of the legislature to
construe the provisions of the statute liberally "for the accomplish-
ment of the purposes thereof .... -77 While the Ohio statute is also
quite similar to the New Jersey statute, the court followed Pennsyl-
vania's example and ruled:
The authority to take 'affirmative action' may well include
extensive powers to effectuate the purpose of the Civil Rights
Act, but, under existing statutory language, those powers are
to be directed towards ending the unlawful discriminatory
practice and securing compliance with the cease and desist
n Zamantakis v. Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973).
nId.
74 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 959 (Supp. 1974).
75 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 99, 308 A.2d 619 (1973).
7638 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974).
7OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (Page 1973).
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order. If the General Assembly had intended to authorize the
commission to grant compensatory or punitive damages, it
would have been a simple matter to explicitly so provide....78
Lacking such power, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission cannot provide
proper relief for a victim of housing discrimination.
The state fair housing statutes routinely provide for judicial re-
view of an administrative order. Any respondent or complainant who
feels the final order of the commission is unjust may have the adminis-
trative proceedings examined by the court. The court may enforce,
modify or set aside the order of the commission. In sex-bias housing
cases, few cases have been so reviewed,7 9 with those mainly concerning
administrative questions and not discriminatory questions.
It is interesting to follow the disposition of cases under the ad-
ministrative procedure. Since Pennsylvania has had its sex-bias
housing statute for the comparatively long time of five years it would
be valuable to examine its experience. From July, 1969 through June,
1974, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission received 154
sex-bias housing charges. Of the 77% that were closed, probable
cause was found in 66% of the cases, with 12% of the cases being
withdrawn by the complainant or administratively. Five per cent of
the probable cause cases went to public hearing, with the rest adjusted
before a hearing. 0 The Commission, recognizing the importance of
compensatory damages for adequate relief, has continued to issue
orders awarding damages, subject to the final determination of the
state supreme court. Despite Pennsylvania's active involvement in
the area and its good record of finding probable cause in a majority of
the cases, if the Pennsylvania Commission is finally denied the power
to award damages, as is presently the case in Ohio, the Commission
will not be able to provide satisfactory relief for housing complainants.
A commission lacking authority to award damages, as well as
lacking emergency injunctive powers to offset the inevitable delays
in the administrative process, is an inadequate forum in which the
complainant can receive proper treatment. As reported by the Com-
mission Against Discrimination in Massachusetts:
[I]in every case [sex discrimination in housing] that ended
in conciliation, the administrative proceedings took so long
7
'Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 222, 313 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1974).
The commission filed a petition for rehearing (No. 73-811, Sup. Ct. of Ohio, June 24,
1974) but it was denied (July 31, 1974). Andrew Ruzicho, Chief, Civil Rights Section,
Office of the Attorney General, said he was generally pleased with the Lysyj decision as the
court, though it failed to construe the remedies section broadly, did construe the violations
power liberally.
7"Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973);
Zamantakis v. Human Relations Comm'n, 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973).
80 CASE STATUS-SEx DISCIuMINATION, supra note 26.
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that the complainant had found another apartment by the
time the case was closed. Thus, the action had little effect on
the complainant or the respondent except to experience the
bureaucracy of the Commission"1
Private Cause of Action
Under the majority of the state fair housing statutes, a complain-
ant is given an option to file a private cause of action, rather than
go through the administrative process. Looking specifically at the
Ohio statute, a housing complainant may commence a private suit
in a court of common pleas. 2 Because of the present inadequacy of
the relief the Ohio Civil Rights Commission can provide, this is the
only effective method for a housing complainant.
Unfortunately many attorneys and many housing complainants
are not aware of this avenue of redress. The Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission states that it is its policy to inform such complainants of this
alternative form of relief, but this is not always done. Remarkably,
in Ohio, there has been only one such suit initiated in the state courts,
and that one was settled in chambers.8 3
Under this procedure, the court may grant a temporary or per-
manent injunction, temporary restraining order or other appropriate
order. Under the Ohio statute the court is also authorized to "grant
such relief as it deems appropriate, including ... actual damages.' '
There is no specific mention of mental anguish or punitive damages,
but the absence of a specific exclusion leaves the way open for the
discretion of the court.
A hindrance to the statute's effectiveness may be its lack of
specific language authorizing payment of attorney's fees for those not
financially able to pay. It is unreasonable to suppose the practicing
bar will undertake representation of discrimination victims without
reasonable expectation of compensation for their services. It is like-
wise unreasonable for the housing bias victim to bear the cost of this
serious, and often expensive, litigation. A few states do have a specific
provision for this. No private attorney has ever tried in Ohio to
receive such fees, but the avenue is certainly open. Looking to the
federal example in this area, federal courts have, in the absence of
specific statutory language, awarded attorney's fees to successful
housing plaintiffs to further the purposes of a statute prohibiting
discrimination. In Lee v. Southern Home Sites," the court of appeals
81 Letter from Dorothy T. Parrish, Director of Research Div., Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, June 20, 1974.
82OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.051(A) (Page 1973).
8 3Tiller v. Bascarczak, No. 902220 (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Jan. 13, 1972).
8OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.051(E) (Page 1973).
85444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
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awarded fees for an attorney in a housing discrimination suit brought
under the Civil Rights Act of 186686 where the statute was silent on
this issue. The court said that "awarding attorney's fees to successful
plaintiffs would facilitate the enforcement of that policy [congressional
policy against discrimination] through private litigation." 87 In more
explicit terms, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in awarding
fees, emphasized:
If a defendant may feel that the cost of litigation, and,
particularly, that the financial circumstances of an injured
party may mean the chances of a suit being brought, or con-
tinued in the face of opposition, will be small, there will be
little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing. In such instances
public policy may suggest an award of costs that will remove
the burden from the shoulders of the plaintiff seeking to
vindicate the public right.68
With the federal example and with the provision calling for a liberal
construction of the Ohio statute,8 9 it is entirely foreseeable that Ohio
attorneys would receive reasonable fees for private housing suits in
the state courts. In addition, there is pending legislation to provide
for such fees.90
The lack of state law in the housing area is not surprising as the
overwhelming majority of private housing cases have been racial
cases, these having been brought under the federal Fair Housing Act.
Attorneys have generally favored the federal courts:
In the past, test case litigators usually opted for the federal
courts on many grounds: the greater sensitivity of the federal
bench to novel constitutional claims; the usually higher intel-
lectual calibre of federal judges; the virtual guarantee of
a written and reported opinion; the relatively efficient opera-
tion of the federal district courts; the accelerated appellate
procedure .... 91
Due to the recent addition of the sex prohibitions to the federal Fair
Housing Act, sex-bias housing cases may now be brought in either
state92 or federal courts. Because of the apparent lack of case law in
-642 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which applies only to race, con-
cerns the right to lease, purchase and sell real and personal property.
87 Lee v. Southern Home Sites, 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1971).
8Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972).
9OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (Page 1973).
90 H.B. 1196, 110th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 4112.051(B) (1973-74).
91 M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 87 (1974).
"Statutes cited note 27 supra.
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this area, in litigating a sex-bias housing case, one must look to the
development of principles and remedies for racial cases brought
under federal fair housing law.93
Federal Response to Housing Discrimination
"States generally took the lead in the enactment of civil rights
legislation and this was true of fair housing legislation. '9 4 The recent
inclusion of sex9" under the Fair Housing Act, while about half the
states have had similar statutes for a number of years, shows Con-
gressional lag in this area. Fortunately, the federal courts have gen-
erally taken the lead in the enforcement of fair housing legislation. In
the short time since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act in 1968
cases have proliferated. Although the Act previously also prohibited
discrimination because of religion and national origin, 96 the important
decisions and principles established by these cases involve race and
color questions almost exclusively.
Provisions of the Law
Basically, the Fair Housing Act reads the same as the Ohio
statute, prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion,
national origin and now sex in the sale, rental, terms and conditions,
advertising and financing of housing or in any other conduct which
otherwise interferes with equal housing opportunities. 7 The Act also
covers "blockbusting" 8 and the provision of brokerage services.9 9 The
Act covers virtually all private residential real estate transactions
expect those concerning religious organizations or private clubs,"'0
single family homes sold or rented without the use of a broker and
93See Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws Against Discrimination, 22
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 259, 278 (1973).
These facts [that the Ohio fair housing statute is very similar to the federal
Fair Housing Act], together with the mandate of the General Assembly that all
provisions of Chapter 4112 are to be construed liberally for the accomplishment
of the chapter's purposes, authorize, indeed obligate, Ohio's agencies to utilize
decisions interpreting the federal acts in administrative and judicial actions
under Chapter 4112.
94 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, Equal
Opportunity in Housing. P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING ff 2301, at 2304 (1973).
" Ostensibly this will be inclusive of conventional sex discrimination and marital status
discrimination. See note 33 supra.
-42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970).
-l4 2 U.S.C. § § 3604, 3605 (1970).
-42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970).
-42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1970).
10042 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970).
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without advertising, 1 1 and multiple dwellings 12 occupied by no more
than four families if the owner lives in one unit.10 3
There are three methods of enforcement. First, the administrative
responsibility for enforcing the Act is with the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD).104 The aggrieved may file a complaint
with HUD, subject to deferral to a state agency that has similar fair
housing legislation. HUD will investigate the claim and try to correct
the discriminatory practice by informal conference. If this fails, the
aggrieved party seeking relief must file a civil action in a United
States district court.105 In this, the federal statute is considerably
weaker than the state statutes. State agencies, if conciliation fails, can
hold public hearings and issue cease and desist orders and, in some
states, award damages. Second, a person may bypass the administra-
tive process and proceed directly to court. 6 Third, the Attorney
General may commence a suit if he feels there is a pattern or practice
of discrimination 107
In federal litigation, the right to equal housing opportunity
secured by the Fair Housing Act is a "fundamental guarantee." 1N,
The Act is the realization of a policy which Congress has accorded
the highest national priority.1 9 The broad sweep of the Act is apparent
from its preface expressing a congressional intention "to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States."110
10142 U.S.C. § 3603(2) (b) (1) (1970).
10242 U.S.C. § 3603(2) (b) (2) (1970).
03 It is important to note here that many of the federal fair housing cases have been grounded
both on the basis of the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970). Although the principles we review in terms of relief and in terms of
applicability of the law have been established through both, it is important to be con-
scious of the general holding that the 1866 Act is directed solely to race and color. Section
1982 concerns equal property rights. Its companion, Section 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970), provides relief where discrimination exists in making and enforcing contracts.
Effectively used in racial discrimination in employment, 1981 actions in sex discrim-
ination have been explicitly rejected. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 375 F.Supp. 413
(E.D. Mo. 1974); League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F.Supp.
636 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Thus, it is unlikely that coupling the two federal statutes in hous-
ing discrimination cases would be permissible in sex-bias housing cases. This is particularly
significant for the Fair Housing Act exemptions. Section 1982 of the 1866 Act is not limited
by single-family or multiple-unit dwelling exemptions, and in race cases involving these
types of dwellings, attorneys have available to them this statute. However, this will probably
not be true for sex discrimination cases. Therefore, it would be important to look at the
provisions of an applicable state statute, which in many cases is broader in coverage than
the Fair Housing Act.
1M 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1970).
10542 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
106 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
W 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
108 Williams v. Matthews, 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cit. 1974).
109Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
11042 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
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What is also very important in fair housing cases is the direction
by the Supreme Court that private lawsuits are the "main generating
force" ' in achieving equal housing opportunity. Due to the inevitable
delays of an administrative proceeding and the lack of effective en-
forcement power in HUD, it may be to the complainant's advantage to
immediately seek a private remedy. The real action in fair housing
cases has come in private litigation. For litigation of a sex-bias hous-
ing case, even in the state courts, one must explore the propositions
which have evolved in the federal fair housing cases.112
The Sole Factor
A practical situation which the single woman commonly faces
is difficulty in apartment rental admission. Sex need not be the only
reason for the refusal to rent, but it must be one factor in the refusal,
to find discrimination. This may be difficult to prove as many manage-
ment companies will use prior residency requirements and credit
rating as factors in consideration. Although ostensibly objective, these
rental standards will be coupled with a "rating" system which will
prefer a married couple over a single male, and a single male over
a single female. In analogous race housing cases, even if admission
rejections were based on legitimate grounds, such as prior residency
or credit, the discrimination is not vitiated if race were merely one
of a number of otherwise valid factors.113
In Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co.,"' the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's opinion that, though
the defendant realty company did not want Negroes in their apart-
ment, an otherwise valid factor, not wishing to rent to a single mother
with a child, made such discrimination not total, and thus not unlaw-
ful. The court of appeals, in finding race a factor in the refusal,
strongly asserted:
Race is an impermissible factor in an apartment rental
decision and . . . it cannot be brushed aside because it was
11 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
12 For further background on federal fair housing law, see Note, Private Litigation for
Equality in Housing, 3 CLASS ACTION REPS. 3 (1974); Note, Racial Discrimination in
the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L. REv. 289 (1973).
113Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Here the
defendant claimed refusal to rent on inadequacy of income and a policy against renting to
to two single females. The court found a violation of the Fair Housing Act in that
race was a factor in the refusal, though not the sole factor. It is interesting to note that the
court stated that a lessor could lawfully adopt a policy of refusing rental to two single
females (defendant's reason for this was the possibility one woman would marry and
the remaining one would not wish to remain in the appartment alone), as long as
race was not a factor. With sex now under the Fair Housing Act, this would be prohibited.
114436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970). Accord, Miller Properties, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n, 34 Ohio App. 2d 113, 296 N.E.2d 300 (1972).
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neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor
of discrimination. We find no acceptable place in the law for
partial racial discrimination.1 1 s
Now with sex having become a valid factor under the Fair Housing
Act, even the policy of refusing to rent to a single mother with a child
may be discriminatory on the basis of sex.
Sex discrimination should be found if a rating system is em-
ployed even if the applicant were rejected for reasons inclusive of
the objective standards."6 In fact, under the Fair Housing Act, the
law provides that any conduct that otherwise makes unavailable
housing is prohibited.1 As one court held:
The foregoing phraseology appears to be as broad as Con-
gress could have made it, and all practices which have the
effect of denying dwellings on prohibited grounds are there-
fore unlawful. 8
A line of fair housing cases have held that the law prohibits "so-
phisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." 1 9 It is
apparent, therefore, that housing discrimination statutes are to be
treated liberally with close judicial scrutiny of the discriminatory
impact of certain conduct.
The Checkers
Admittedly it is difficult to prove discrimination. It is not some-
thing people talk about. One of the more conventional, and the most
effective, methods of proving housing discrimination is through the
process of "checking" or "testing," where a white, in a racial case,
similar in situation to the black is sent out soon after a black has
been informed that no vacancies exist or, in more blatant circum-
stances, where a policy of not renting on account of race is stated.
Evidence of the experience of checkers has been uniformly admitted
1 Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970).
116 The same logic of sex not necessarily being the "sole" factor for rejection has been utilized
in employment discrimination cases. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for
example, in explaining the breadth of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, struck
down United Air Lines "no-marriage" regulation, holding:
[the Act] is not confined to explicit discriminations based 'solely' on sex. Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).
11742 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970).
118United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F.Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
119 1d. at 648. Accord, United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cit. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.Supp.
776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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to show the existence of a discriminatory policy. 120 In housing cases,
the courts have lauded checkers as serving the public interest in
achieving fair housing.121
Admissibility of checking evidence in housing discrimination is
a common sense rule, providing one of the few effective means to
determine if illegal practices are being engaged in and deprivations
of equal housing opportunities are being perpetrated. It is an expedi-
tious evidentiary dimension in race cases and should be simply and
effectively employed in sex discrimination matters. It is significant
to note that in the New Jersey sex-bias housing case, Zahorian v.
Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 122 a checker was used to prove dis-
crimination on account of sex. A male, similar in situation to the
complainant was told there were available apartments, and thus the
hearing examiner concluded that "unrelated male roommates were not
regarded either by respondents or their principals as prima facie
objectionable tenants, female roommates were. 123
The Use of Statistics
The use of statistics in housing discrimination cases is employed
effectively in establishing prima facie cases. Typical in the fair hous-
ing decisions using statistics is the oft-cited reference to State of
Alabama v. United States: "In the problem of racial discrimination,
statistics often tell much, and Courts listen." 124 The Alabama language
has been commonly used in equal housing law.
125
Thus, if an apartment rents to married or single men, the absence
of single females may establish a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion, placing on the landlord the burden to come forward with evidence
to show a nondiscriminatory policy on the basis of sex.
26
120 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958); Williamson
v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F.Supp. 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Newbern v. Lake
Lorelei, Inc., 308 F.Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968). See Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp.,
499 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1974).
121 Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Youritan Constr.
Co., 370 F.Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
'"62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
12 3id. at 403, 301 A.2d at 757.
u 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
12sUnited States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F.Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973); United States
v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972); United States v.
Reddoch, P-H EQUAL OpP. IN HOUSING fJ 13,569, at 13, 776 (S.D. Ala. 1972, a/I'd, 467
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F.Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
126 See United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F.Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973); United
States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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Nor will it be legal to limit the number of females in admission
requirements. The Fair Housing Act makes no distinctions between
the failure to rent to any one class and where several of that class have
been previously rented apartments.1 7
The Pre-Act Policy
Evidence of discriminatory housing occurring before such conduct
was illegal is nevertheless admissible as showing that the policy may
still exist. This logical approach has resulted as "most persons will
not admit publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice. . .. "I"
Such discrimination merely goes underground once it is proclaimed
illegal.
The leading case for this principle is United States v. West Peach-
tree Tenth Corp.,12 9 where the court allowed evidence of an admitted
policy prior to the effective date of the Fair Housing Act of excluding
Negroes.
When there is a finding of a pre-Act pattern or practice of
discrimination, and little or no evidence indicates a post-Act
change in such pattern or practice up to the time the suit is
filed, a strong inference that the pre-Act pattern or practice
continuted after the effective date of the Act arises. Such
evidence alone does not create a prima facie case of post-Act
pattern or practice, but it is of significant probative value.
130
If an owner fails to inform his rental agent of a change in policy
after passage of the statute forbidding such discrimination, this may
be considered discriminatory conduct.131 This rule is paramountly
significant because of the comparatively recent enactments around
the country prohibiting sex discrimination in housing. The use of
some of the overt past practices barring single women in apartment
rentals is important in proving cases filed under these new laws.
The Awarding of Damages
The greatest impact in eradicating housing discrimination has
come about through the awards of damages to successful plaintiffs.
12United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F.Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973). In Youritan,
the court found a prima facie case of racial discrimination where only 1.2% of 1133
apartments were occupied by blacks. The Fair Housing Act provides that any conduct which
otherwise interferes with equal housing opportunity is unlawful (42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1970) ). This broad provision has been given the most literal interpretation, prohibiting
all types of housing discrimination. Justifications in limiting or depriving equal opportu-
nities, even in good faith, have been characterized by one recent federal panel as "pure
chimera." Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974).
12 Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F.Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d
1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
12437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
13 Id. at 227.
131 United States v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972)..
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One Cleveland area broker characterizes damage awards in fair
housing cases as "the sting," perhaps the most significant deterrent to
discriminatory practices.
It has been shown that the various states are in conflict over the
power of an administrative agency to make damage awards. And,
even if one goes directly to a state court, there may still be a question
as to allowable damages, as in Ohio, where the statute only mentions
the power of the court to grant actual damages, with no specific
provision for punitive damages. In contrast, the Fair Housing Act
does make specific allowance for the court to award actual damages
plus an additional punitive damage award up to $1,000.131 Its sister
statute, the 1866 Act,133 while having no explicit statutory authoriza-
tion for damages, like most state housing discrimination statutes, has
been used in awards for discrimination for compensatory and punitive
damages." 4
Some courts have justified damages as the rule for the simple
impairment of a federal civil right.35 Other courts couple the obstruc-
tion of the civil right with the humiliation and discomfort of the
deprivation.1 36 It should be pointed out that if a complainant ultimately
is offered of the property, the damage element does not become moot.137
The humiliating outrage of denial of equal housing opportunities,
long having been ignored, has been given sepcial scrutiny by the
federal courts in recent years.133 In Allen v. Gifford,39 for example,
the plaintiffs were awarded $3,500 in compensatory damages and
$5,000 in punitive damages, even though the defendant eventually
offered the plaintiffs the desired property. To place housing discrim-
ination in proper legal prespective, one state jury awarded $10,500 in
statutory, actual and punitive damages for the refusal to rent to a
family on discriminatory grounds. 4 Another court provided for a
1'42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
1342 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
134 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1973); Matthews v. Mayne, Civil No. 73-618-T, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN
HOUSING f 13,660, at 14,286 (D. Md. June 18, 1974).
135 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
13 Seaton v. Sky Realty Company, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).
137 Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1970); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F.Supp.
317 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 (6th
Cir. 1974).
13Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty
Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F.Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
139368 F.Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
14 0P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING 1 47.1 (1973). The award was for statutory, actual and
punitive damages. It was reduced by the court from $13,500, which included attorney's
fees, due to jurisdictional problems. The suit was brought under California's Unruh Civil
Rights Act, Cal. CIVIL CODE §§ 51, 52 (West Supp. 1974), and the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866).
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total of nearly $7,000 in actual, compensatory and punitive damages
against a housing management company for discrimination.1 4 1 Com-
pare this with the housing-bias damage awards made by the state
administrative agencies: $400 for loss of right by the Washington
State Human Rights Commission (which the commission reports is
the largest monetary award in a sex-bias housing case) ;142 $750 for
pain and suffering in a sex-bias housing case by the New Jersey
Division on Civil Rights.143 Clearly the federal courts have a greater
sensitivity for the damage caused by a discriminatory act.
Whatever the legal grounds, it appears that the awards for hous-
ing discrimination in the federal courts are becoming more substantial
as litigation increases. It is a further sign of increased sensitivity by
the bench to curb unlawful housing bias and to make equal housing
opportunity a reality. It should be expected that equivalent damage
awards will be granted in sex discrimination cases.
The Awarding of Attorney's Fees
A critical dimension of the broad based judicial enforcement of
equal housing opportunity depends on lawyers. As the Supreme Court
has candidly recognized, the task of enforcing fair housing is enor-
mous.lM Under the Fair Housing Act, lawyers can use both the ad-
ministrative process 145 and file their cases in federal district court 146
at the same time. Thus, the often lengthy administrative delays do
not obstruct the expeditious manner in which housing discrimination
cases are to be treated.147
If the task of fair housing enforcement is as critical as the
Supreme Court suggests, implicit in that recognition is the necessity
of greater input by the private bar.1 48 Accordingly, one of the most
141 Marshall v. Pendley, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING 13,615, at 14,012 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
The award was made to a group of five plaintiffs who applied together for an apartment.
142 Supra note 33.
'43 Supra note 35.
144Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
145 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
1642 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
17 In fact, a common defense technique in fair housing practice is to raise the necessity of
exhaustion of administrative remedies with HUD. This reasoning, however, has been
expressly rejected, with many courts recognizing Congress' intent to provide concurrent
remedies. Johnson v. Decker, 333 F.Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Brown v. LoDuca, 307
F.Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969). Presumably, in the absence of a provision to the contrary,
in those states which provide both civil actions and administrative avenues, the same logic
should apply.
14 Bearing this out, in its recent report, the United States Commission on Civil Rights con-
cluded its findings that governmental measures to enforce equal housing opportunities in
America have failed. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
IN SUBURBIA, at 68 (July, 1974) (copy available from U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights).
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effective inducements in its involvement has been the awards of
attorney's fees. While the Fair Housing Act has a specific provision for
attorney's fees, 149 the Civil Rights Act of 1866, like many of the state
housing discrimination statutes, has no express statutory provision
for the award of fees. Yet, the absence of express authorization for
attorneys' fees should not deter involvement because of the successful
litigation brought under the 1866 Act. Courts have applied the logic
of the Supreme Court in awarding fees even in the absence of a
statute provision:
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their
own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a
position to advance the public interest by involving the in-
junctive powers of the federal courts.1 50
The evolution of the so-called "private attorney general" theory has
been applied in fair housing. 151 Impetus for the award of fees has been
given because of the Supreme Court's language that fair housing law
suits are important "in vindicating a policy that Congress considered
to be of the highest priority.'15 2 Thus, even without a provision for
fees, lawyers should be compensated for vindicating equal housing
opportunity violations on the basis of race or sex. With regard to
housing bias, one judge explicitly said:
[P]ublic policy demands that counsel fees be awarded in
housing discrimination cases so that prejudiced individuals
will not be hesitant in enforcing their rights.1 53
The explicit language of the Fair Housing Act limits fee awards
to one "not financially able" to assume the costs of a lawyer. For-
tunately courts have recently employed realistic assessments of what
"not financially able" really means in equal housing opportunity
litigation. One federal judge brought home in clear terms what par-
meters are not to be employed:
Adoption of indigency as the test would summarily preclude
recovery of any fees by persons with the financial ability to
own any kind of home or to seriously seek home ownership.
Therefore, the Court will consider financial inability within
the special context of § 3612 (c) to mean a homeowner or
14942 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
1 50Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
151 Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cit. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Bradley v. School Board -...... U.S -..... , 94 S. Ct.
2006 (May 15, 1974).
'
52 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
1s3 Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F.Supp. 618, 620-21 (E.D. N.C. 1974).
1-42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
[Vol. 24: 79
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/8
SEX BIAS IN HOUSING
prospective homeowner of limited financial ability who clearly
lacks the resources to fight a legal battle . . . without en-
dangering his status as a homeowner or potential home-
owner l55
By and large, the most likely plaintiff will be the moderate income
black or female who is required to undertake "this important type
of litigation" 156 in order to secure the same rights any white or male
has available.
Furthermore, a plaintiff's present ability to pay has been rejected
as the only standard of what constitutes "not financially able." His
ability to assume such fees must also be considered 5 7 One federal
appellate court has held in effect that attorney's fees may be awarded
as a matter of course once liability is established.15 8 In adopting the
logic of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,59 which recognizes
the futility of successful plaintiffs bearing their own fees, another
federal appellate court ordered a lower court to reconsider a $400
fee as too low and awarded $1,000 in addition for the appeal. 160 What
has evolved is a recent body of law supporting the principle that it
is often the moderate income person against whom discrimination
is perpetrated and for whom attorney's fees should be made available.
Conclusion
The major problem that women face in housing is the denial of
equal rental opportunities. It is an immediate problem. And it is a
problem that has clearly been bypassed. Now with the inclusion of
sex-bias prohibitions in the Fair Housing Act, the problem can more
readily be approached.
But it has been six years since the Fair Housing Act was enacted
and HUD is "just getting started in enforcing provisions of the 1968
Civil Rights Act.1' 61 It is questionable, in view of its past record,
what impact HUD will have on sex discrimination in housing. Like-
wise, at the state administrative level there has not yet been much
progress. In Ohio, "the problem of housing discrimination .. has not
even been tapped.... "62
us Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F.Supp. 291, 297-98 (D. Md. 1973).
1'6 Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1974).
"s Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cit. 1973). The court of appeals reduced
a $2450 fee award to $2000 because the fair housing violation was a simple statutory action
involving very little time.
158Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973).
19390 U.S. 400 (1968).
16Jeanry v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974).
161 Rasanen, Antidiscrimination drive at HUD lags after 6 years, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland),
Aug. 18, 1974, at 32A, Col. 3 (remarks by Dr. Gloria E. A. Toote, Assistant Secretary for
Equal Opportunity, United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Development).
162 Comment by Frank Gibb, Complaince Director, Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, in OHIO
CIVIL RIGHTs COMM'N, QUARTERLY REPORT Vol. 1, No. 1, at 5 (Winter 1974).
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Parties seeking justice under sex discrimination statutes will
encounter hazards regardless of the course of action pursued or the
remedy sought. The inclusion of sex-bias proscriptions to the Fair
Housing Act make it foreseeable that litigation will be focused at the
federal level. 16 3 Yet attorneys should be cognizant that in some juris-
dictions the applicable state statute may be more comprehensive.
Ineffective administrative relief, dispensed by federal and state
agencies, has forced and, in the future, will force parties searching
for meaningful relief into the private litigation arena.
At this point, then, the housing attorney is challenged with the
task of pioneering new approaches to equal opportunity in housing.
But at this time there are few fair-housing attorneys. So it appears
that what is needed is a tightening up of the administrative process
so that a housing complainant can also find justice in an effective
administrative forum. However, a major change in federal and state
legislation is not foreseeable. Thus, the enforcement of fair housing
opportunity will ultimately depend on the practicing bar.
Betsey Friedman*
16 3 As might be expected, upon enactment of the sex amendment to the Fair Housing Act,
a Cleveland fair housing attorney voluntarily dismissed a sex-bias housing case pending in
the state court and refiled it in United States district court, in what may be the first sex-bias
housing case under the Fair Housing Act. Voloshen v. Jordan, Civil No. C74-788 (N.D,
Ohio, Sept. 23, 1974). The plaintiff, a divorcee, contended she was being evicted because
the defendant landlords felt she could not properly maintain a house without a man. The
plaintiff was awarded damages and attorney's fees.
* Editors note: Special acknowledgement should be extended to the civil rights comissions
of the different states. Several of them have spent a considerable amount of time in providing
information towards the preparation of this article. Miscellaneous materials cited herein
are on file at The Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshal College of Law Library,
unless otherwise indicated.
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